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Increasing attention is being paid to IMF governance, and the structure and size of the Fund’s lending 
operations. However, less interest has been shown in the array of lending windows through which the 
IMF makes resources available. There have nonetheless been clear trends over recent years in the 
extent to which the windows are used. What discussion has occurred has been largely qualitative. In 
this paper, and as far as the data allow, we adopt a quantitative approach and focus on the extent to 
which the economic circumstances in which countries sign extended and concessionary arrangements 
differ from those in which they sign conventional stand bys. On this basis, we claim that there is a 
strong case for discontinuing the EFF but for continuing the PRGF. The paper also discusses, more 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Questions are increasingly being asked about many aspects of the International 
Monetary Fund’s organisational structure. Common amongst them are those that 
relate to governance; including the structure of the Executive Board, quotas and 
voting rights. However, rather less attention has been paid to the range of lending 
facilities or windows through which the IMF makes its loans. In some ways this is 
surprising since one dimension of the claim that the Fund has exhibited ‘mission 
creep’ may be seen in the proliferation of IMF lending windows. From a situation in 
the early 1950s, when all IMF lending was conducted via stand-by arrangements, by 
the end of the 1990s there were six facilities under which client countries could, in 
principle, borrow from the Fund. 
 
From amongst them the most frequently used windows, in addition to conventional 
stand-bys, were the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF). The implicit logic of having an array of facilities must be 
that they serve different purposes. Certainly PRGFs differ from SBAs and EFFs in as 
much as assistance is granted at concessionary rates and only to low-income 
countries. Furthermore, the Fund’s rubric relating to each of its facilities suggests that 
they meet different needs. But are these claims matched by reality? Is it possible to 
pick up discernible differences in the economic characteristics of countries that draw 
from the IMF under different facilities. Up to now there is no study that has sought to 
answer this question in a formal fashion. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. Based on an analysis of 
IMF programs over the period 1975 – 2000, it examines whether there are statistically   3
significant differences in the economic circumstances under which countries borrow 
under EFF and PRGF facilities as opposed to conventional SBAs. If there are, the 
IMF may have devised an appropriate array of lending windows. If not, the question 
arises as to whether the Fund needs to retain all of them. Might there be scope for 
rationalisation? And if so, which windows should be left open and which should be 
closed? 
 
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 provides a brief account of the 
evolution of IMF facilities, and reports the Fund’s rationale for their separate status. 
Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics to show the extent to which the facilities 
have been used in the period since the beginning of the 1990s. These will show that 
some of the facilities are little used. Section 4 goes on to focus on those current 
programs that have been used most heavily; SBAs, EFFs, and PRGFs. It explores the 
extent to which the use of these particular facilities is connected to statistically 
significant differences in economic circumstances, and examines whether the stated 
differences in the facilities are reflected empirically. In the light of the findings 
reported, Section 5 goes on to consider the scope for reorganising and rationalising 
the current range of IMF facilities. Finally, Section 6 offers a few concluding remarks 
about how reform of the IMF’s range of lending windows fits into the broader debate 
about IMF governance. 
 
 
2.  The IMF’s Lending Facilities: Brief Description and History
1 
 
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on Bird (2003).   4
By way of background, this section provides a brief description of the Fund’s 
financial facilities, and the circumstances in which they were introduced.
2 The IMF 
has recently reviewed its facilities, and a detailed and current description of them are 
found in the associated papers available on their website.  
 
Since 1952 the Fund has used stand-by arrangements to make financing available to 
member countries with a balance of payments need. The typical SBA is for 12-18 
months, with financing being conditional on the borrower fulfilling specified 
performance requirements; conditionality is phased over a series of credit tranches 
which become progressively stricter. Loans must be repaid within 3¼ to 5 years. To 
supplement SBAs the Fund introduced the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) in 
1963 to assist countries in dealing with the effects of externally generated and 
temporary export shortfalls. The conditionality attached to CFF loans was light by 
comparison with upper credit tranche stand-bys and only required countries to be co-
operating in making reasonable efforts to deal with their balance of payments 
difficulties. Over time the CFF was modified in various ways. Access to it was 
liberalised significantly in 1966, 1975 and 1979 and there was a surge in drawings 
under the CFF in 1976 and in the early 1980s. It was also expanded in 1981 to cover 
excess payments on the import of cereals associated with poor domestic harvests, and, 
                                                 
2 There are other lending programmes used by the Fund that are not covered in this section. The IMF 
may, for example, lend Emergency Assistance for Natural Disasters. However, this is not a ‘facility’ as 
such but rather a ‘flexible application of the existing policies on use of the credit tranches’. In a similar 
vein the Fund offers Emergency Assistance for Post-Conflict Countries where ‘institutional and 
administrative capacity has been disrupted as a result of conflict’. The Fund created a Y2K Facility in 
1999 which was unused and lapsed in 2000. it also from 1989 stood ready to support the upfront costs 
of debt reduction schemes alongside the Brady Plan via its Debt and Debt Service Reduction (DDSR) 
operations. In 1995 it established Currency Stabilisation Funds (CSFs) as an element within stand-by 
and extended arrangements to provide additional precautionary support in the initial stag of exchange 
rate-based stabilisation. Both the DDSR and the CSF were discontinued as part of the Fund’s review of 
its facilities in 2000 and are not discussed in this paper. Their introduction is, however, further 
evidence of the process by which Fund lending has evolved and this is discussed later. For the IMF’s 
view on how its facilities needed to be reformed see IMF (2000). The proposals contained in this report 
are far from radical. 
   5
in 1988, was expanded still further to cover increases in interest payments associated 
with rising world interest rates. However, during 1983-88 the conditionality 
associated with the CFF was tightened and in effect it lost its low conditionality 
status
3. Access was modified to depend on whether a country already had in place a 
high conditionality programme with the IMF or would be deemed acceptable for one. 
In 1988 the facility was also renamed the Compensatory and Contingency Financing 
Facility (CCFF) to reflect the wider range of contingencies that, in principle, were 
covered by it. 
 
Returning to the 1960s, the problem of export instability to which the CFF was 
originally directed had also been associated with a downward movement in the terms 
of trade of many primary products in relation to manufactured goods. Commodity 
agreements were to become an important theme within the context of a New 
International Economic Order during the 1970s as a way of dealing with both adverse 
terms of trade movements and price instability, and, in 1968, the Fund introduced the 
Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF) to assist countries that encountered balance of 
payments problems as a consequence of contributing to such schemes. 
 
The problems encountered by developing countries also lay behind the introduction of 
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1974, which aimed to provide medium-term 
finance to help with structural adjustment, particularly for economies ‘characterised 
by slow growth and an inherently weak balance of payments position which prevents 
pursuit of an active development policy’. Also in the 1970s the Fund introduced, as a 
temporary measure, the Oil Facility (1974-76) to help countries deal with the balance 
of payments consequences of the four-fold increase in the price of oil in 1973. To help 
                                                 
3 An early critique of these changes may be found in Dell (1985).   6
poorer countries, a Subsidy Account was introduced supported by a Trust Fund 
financed by gold sales, which allowed the rate of interest on drawings under the Oil 
Facility to be reduced. 
 
The Trust Fund was used again in the late 1980s to help establish the Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF) and then the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF). These facilities were therefore different from stand-bys, the CFF, the BSFF 
and the EFF inasmuch as they were not financed from the General Resources Account 
(GRA) of the IMF and were on concessionary terms. However, they were similar 
inasmuch as their increasing emphasis on conditionality. Indeed the SAF, which was 
perceived as having fairly weak conditionality, was quickly supplemented and soon 
replaced by the ESAF where conditionality often incorporated not only the traditional 
elements of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy, but also structural 
conditionality relating to the micro economy and openness. 
 
The 1990s witnessed a further proliferation of lending facilities. Just as the Oil 
Facility had been introduced to help deal with the aftermath of the oil crises in the 
1970s, the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) was introduced temporarily (1993-
95) with low conditionality to assist countries in transition (CITS) during the early 
phases of moving towards market-based economic systems. 
 
The Fund also responded to the financial crises that were a feature of the 1990s. 
Following the Mexican crisis in 1994 and then the East Asian crisis in 1997/98, it 
established the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) in 1997, ‘to supplement 
resources made available under SBAs and the EFF in order to provide financial 
assistance for exceptional balance of payments difficulties owing to a large short-term   7
financing need resulting from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence’. 
Two years later in 1999 it introduced the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) to provide a 
‘precautionary line of defence’ for counties with ‘strong economic policies’ against 
balance of payments problems resulting from international financial contagion. 
 
The Fund had come a long way from the days when stand-bys were seen as an 
adequate modality for dealing with all balance of payments difficulties. Had it come 
too far?  In 2000 it began a full review of its array of lending facilities. Critics – one 
of the authors included (Bird, 1995) – had for some time been suggesting that there 
was scope for rationalisation or, in the terminology preferred by the Fund, 
‘streamlining’ (or even ‘house-cleaning’). What emerged from this review? 
 
The Fund decided to discontinue the BSFF; not unreasonably since no drawing had 
been made under the facility for 16 years, and no commodity agreements existed for 
which BSFF financing was eligible. It also went on to remove the contingency 
element of the CCFF returning the facility to its former status (and name) as the CFF, 
largely because operational difficulties – ‘complexity and rigidity’ – had meant that 
this element had been little used – and not used at all for eight years
4. Some Executive 
Directors apparently favored eliminating the CFF altogether on the grounds that it is 
difficult to measure the extent of an export shortfall and the extent to which it is 
temporary, that resources are provided ‘up front’ in a way that ‘can weaken economic 
reform incentives’, and that adjustment is difficult to ensure outside an SBA or EFF 
(or indeed an ESAF, which was renamed the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
in 1999). However, the majority of Executive Directors on the Fund’s Board favoured 
retaining the CFF provided it was confined ‘to cases where arrangements are in place 
                                                 
4 The IMF (1999) in its review of the CCFF quotes James Boughton’s assessment of the contingency 
window as ‘a hydra-headed facility of mind-numbing and self-defeating complexity’.   8
or in which the balance of payments position is deemed satisfactory apart from a 
temporary export shortfall or cereal import excess’. 
 
The Executive Board also opted to retain the EFF, but confirmed that users of this 
facility would be expected to have only ‘limited access to private capital’ and ‘an 
appropriately strong structural reform program to deal with the embedded institutional 
or economic weaknesses’. The EFF was now presented as an appropriate facility for 
those countries graduating from a PRGF program or for CITS without ‘enough’ 
access to capital markets. Strict conditionality therefore continues to be a key feature 
of the EFF, as well as the CFF. This was also true in the case of the SRF and CCL. 
Although the latter facility had been modified slightly in November 2000,
5 the 
changes had not altered its high conditionality status. In order to draw resources under 
the CCL, countries had to be pursuing policies that would, in effect, make them 
eligible to draw under a higher credit tranche SBA. However, the CCL never proved 
popular since countries were concerned that negotiating one would transmit a negative 
signal to markets. Unused, the facility was abandoned in 2003.
6 
 
This brief historical tour of the IMF’s lending windows provides us with a sense of 
how facilities and programs have evolved, but does not answer the question of 
                                                 
5 The changes are reported in a ‘Summing Up by the Acting Chairman of the IMF Executive Board: 
Contingent Credit Lines’. The text is difficult to summarise succinctly, but it explains – not always 
clearly – how a country has to satisfy four criteria in order to be eligible for assistance under the 
modified CCL. In large measure the criteria seek to ensure that policies deemed appropriate by the 
Fund are in place right up to the moment resources are drawn. Thus agreement at an earlier stage seems 
to offer no absolute guarantee that resources will be available when the country wishes to activate a 
drawing. The final criterion requires a member to submit ‘a satisfactory economic and financial 
programme, including a quantified framework, which the member stands ready to adjust as needed’. 
Moreover ‘such policies would be expected to be of sufficient quality and strength that they would 
meet the standards required of drawings in the upper credit tranches’.  
6 Again clarity is at something of a premium since while ‘the member would be expected to meet 
repurchase expectations … Fund supported programmes will continue to be guided by the requirement 
that the member should be able to meet repurchase obligations (rather than expectations). Moreover, it 
seems that to meet repurchase expectations the external position of a member will have to be stronger 
than that projected at the time of an arrangement. Thus to meet repurchase expectations it seems that 
the balance of payments improvement has to have been unexpected!   9
whether or not the current configuration of facilities is appropriate. Do they all fulfil a 
distinct and useful function? We shall attempt to answer this question in two ways. In 
the following section we provide descriptive statistics on the use made of the 
facilities. Next, in Section 4, and from amongst those facilities that have been most 
heavily used, we shall examine the extent to which they fulfil distinct functions. 
 
3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
As reported by the (IMF, 2000), over the period 1989 – 1999 SBAs were the most 
commonly used non-concessionary facility. Also, while there were about as many 
CCFF arrangements as EFF arrangements, the amount of assistance provided by EFFs 
was about five times as much as that provided by the CCFF. In turn, EFFs were 
quantitatively only about half as important as SBAs. 
 
How have things changed in subsequent years? Data in Table 1 relate to arrangements 
in effect over the period 1995-2004. These show that the CCFF/CFF has not been 
used, and that since 2000 there has been a sharp decline in the use of the EFF, with 
only two EFFs arrangements being signed in 2004. Table 2 provides information on 
outstanding IMF credit. It confirms the effective demise of the CCFF/CFF and also 
reflects the declining use of extended arrangements; although even in 2003 
outstanding credit under EFFs was only just under half as much as under SBAs. 
 
TABLES 1 and 2  ABOUT HERE  
 
Should some of these facilities be allowed to fall into disuse?  In the next section we 
examine the main IMF facilities to see whether there are discernible differences in the   10
economic circumstances of the countries that use them. Is there sufficient distinction 
between them to justify their continued existence? Although we do not include the 
CFF as part of this examination, given the paucity of evidence upon which to draw, 
we do discuss the rationale of a separate compensatory facility in Section 5. 
 
4.  Empirical Results: Method and Findings. 
 
The purpose of this section is to see whether there are statistically significant 
differences between the economic circumstances under which countries draw under 
the three main Fund facilities (SBA, EFF, SAF/ESAF/PRGF). It may be, of course, 
that the facilities differ in terms of the conditionalties that are attached to them. We do 
not examine this directly in this section, although we do discuss it in the following 
one. However, it may seem reasonable to assume that the design of programs and the 
related conditionality should be linked to the causes of economic distress that lead to 
IMF support begin sought in the first place. In this case differences in the content of 
conditionality should reflect differences in the factors determining IMF programs. 
 
The paper examines all SBA, EFF and SAF/ESAF/PRGF agreements over the period 
1975-2000. We only examine the population of signed agreements (for which data 
exist) since our purpose here is not to explain whether countries do or do not sign 
programs, but rather the facility to which the program is attributed. We omit from our 
sample countries that had overlapping programs under different facilities.  We base 
our analysis on what has become a fairly structured economic model of the 
determinants of IMF programs. There is a substantial literature on this that we do not 
seek to summarise here, except to note that there is a broad degree of consensus with 
regards the most important economic variables (see Bird and Rowlands 2001 for a   11
brief summary of the literature). More recent research has augmented the standard 
economic model with additional political variables to assess whether IMF lending is 
systematically political in nature (Thacker, 1999, Bird and Rowlands, 2001, Anderson 
et al 2006). These studies have usually focused on the idea that there is a significant 
US influence over the incidence of IMF programs. However, in the current paper we 
are not concerned about potential political bias. Our concern is rather whether there is 
any revealed economic logic in distinguishing between SBAs, EFFs and PRGFs and 
whether the Fund’s claims about the differences between them that are presented in 
terms of the underlying economic circumstances are matched by empirical reality. 
 
Having created our sample of countries we then use Stata to run a multinomial logit 
model on the data. This allows us to identify any significant differences between both 
EFFs and SBAs, and PRGFs and SBAs in terms of the likely determining factors. 
Since EFFs and PRGFs are, in principle, intended to help deal with longer term 
structural problems as well as problems of short-term stabilisation, we include in our 
basic model proxies for these in the form of longer term growth and longer term 
inflation. We ran various specifications of the model but only report in detail the 
results from the one we believed to be the most satisfactory in tersm of having as 
large a sample as possible. The inclusion of some additional variables, such as the 
budget deficit, severely reduced the sample size. The results from our preferred model 
are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Details relating to data sources and the definitions of 
the variables included in our model are provided in an Appendix. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
   12
Table 3 reports our findings for the comparison between EFFs and SBAs. We use 
SBAs as our point of comparison, so this Table identifies those country characteristics 
that differ significantly between countries that sign SBAs and those that sign EFF 
agreements. The basic findings are that, apart from recent past programs, there are no 
statistically significant differences between EFFs and SBAs. In the case of past 
programs, EFFs appear to be significantly associated with fewer recent past programs. 
In essence, then, the alternative seems to be between serial stand-by agreements and 
one longer term EFF.  Perhaps the Fund has been keen to keep countries with a 
history of engagement on a relatively short leash; this is better achieved by SBAs than 
by EFFs. 
 
Although it just fails tests of significance in Table 3, publicly guaranteed debt-to-GDP 
did show up as being significantly different for EFFs than for SBAs in other 
specifications of the model. There is therefore perhaps some weak evidence that 
countries that have borrowed heavily in capital markets are more likely to sign SBAs 
than EFFs. This is consistent with the Fund’s defence of the EFF, since it is supposed 
to assist countries with limited access to private capital. However, overall, the results 
reported in Table 3 do not provide compelling evidence that countries drawing under 
EFFs have discernibly different economic circumstances than those drawing under 
SBAs. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 4 reports our findings when we repeat this exercise for a comparison between 
SAFs /ESAFs /PRGFs (i.e. concessionary lending financed by the IMF’s Trust Fund) 
and SBAs financed from the General Resources Account (GRA). Here we find a   13
larger number of significant differences. First, and unsurprisingly, countries drawing 
under the concessionary programs have lower per capita income. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, they have a faster rate of economic growth over the previous five years. 
Although their longer-term inflation is higher, perhaps reflecting in part structural 
deficiencies, a higher contemporary rate of inflation makes it more likely that 
countries will have SBAs than PRGFs. This may reflect problems of short-term 
instability which in turn make short-term stabilisation under an SBA more 
appropriate. The finding that PRGF countries have higher levels of past rescheduling 
probably reflects their need for some form of debt relief under the umbrella of the 
Paris Club (or London Club). Since the characteristics of countries using EFFs are 
largely indistinguishable from those using SBAs, by implication users of PRGFs 
differ from SBA users in the same way as they differ from EFF countries.  
 
The basic message from our findings is that the economic circumstances surrounding 
the signing of EFF programs are little different from those surrounding SBAs. There 
is perhaps some weak evidence that EFF countries have relatively impaired access to 
private capital but this frequently fails standard significance tests. There is no 
evidence that they are ‘characterised by slow growth and an inherently weak balance 
of payments position’ as the IMF claims that they are. The economic circumstances 
found in PRGF countries are also in many ways similar to those found in SBA 
countries, but since eligibility for PRGF loans is limited to low income countries, it is 
reassuring that the association with low per capita income is confirmed by our data. 
Beyond this, there is at least a muted message that countries drawing under the PRGF 
have longer-term macroeconomic disequilibria that may be associated with structural 
shortcomings. What implications do these results have for the configuration of IMF 
lending windows?   14
 
5.  Reorganising IMF Lending Windows. 
 
The justification for retaining or introducing IMF facilities should rest on two related 
criteria. The first is that the facility is directed towards dealing with countries that 
have a distinct set of economic characteristics and problems. The second is that the 
nature of the required conditionality differs. At the time of writing (May 2005) the 
IMF has two facilities that have either not been recently used or seem to be being used 
less and less. Should these lending windows be scrapped or re-energised? 
 
In the case of the EFF, there are strong grounds for discontinuation on the basis of the 
empirical results reported in the previous section. There appear to be no important and 
significant economic distinctions between countries that have borrowed under EFFs 
as compared to SBAs. Moreover, other studies have historically found little 
meaningful difference between EFFs and SBAs in terms of conditionality. Even if 
differences in conditionality do exist they tend to be in that EFFs contain additional 
structural conditions. But the Fund has been engaged in a process of ‘streamlining’ 
conditionality since the early 2000s; it has been paring down structural conditions. It 
may therefore not be coincidental that the EFF seems to have fallen out of favor.  
 
The gap left by the demise of the EFF, specifically the absence of a non-concessional 
longer-term program aimed at structural problems, could be filled in one of two ways. 
First, the IMF could use sequential SBAs, as it seems to now, or if necessary modify 
the SBA to allow for longer term agreements.  In this instance the existing 
concessionary versus non-concessionary dichotomy of Fund facilities would be 
maintained. Alternatively, the EFF could be merged into the PRGF to deal with   15
longer-term structural problems in both poorer developing and middle-income 
emerging market countries, maintaining the short-term versus long-term distinction of 
IMF programs. In this case the combined EFF-PRGF facility could be financed in part 
from the GRA as well as the Trust Fund, with the rate of subsidy adjusted to reflect 
the level of per capita income of the borrower. 
  
Our findings do suggest that it is sensible to retain the PRGF – merged with the EFF 
or on its own. The retention of the PRGF is warranted not only because the nature of 
conditionality may differ from that incorporated in conventional stand-bys by 
including structural elements, but also because the circumstances under which poor 
countries use the PRGF seem to differ from those that are associated with SBAs.  
 
This leaves open the question of the future of the CFF. Given its almost zero usage 
over recent years we were unable to undertake the same empirical exercise as we did 
for extended and concessionary arrangements. However, it does seem appropriate that 
the Fund should retain and indeed enhance a facility that is designed to deal with 
short-term external shocks that make unsustainable a balance of payments that would 
otherwise have been sustainable. The logic here is that the Fund should be able to help 
countries offset the effects of temporary negative exogenous shocks. Assuming that 
the shocks are indeed temporary and will be reversed, it follows that what countries 
require is financial assistance designed to overcome short-term illiquidity. Since the 
Fund’s financial help should be disbursed quickly in these circumstances, there are 
persuasive arguments for such lending to involve ‘low’ conditionality, as indeed was 
the situation with the original version of the CFF. Moreover, the moral hazard 
argument for conditionality is not relevant if the shock is exogenous. One suspects 
that the Fund’s lack of enthusiasm for the CFF reflects the operational difficulties in   16
measuring ‘temporary external shocks’ rather than opposition to the basic idea of 
compensating against external shocks. While it is certainly true that there are 
problems in identifying contemporaneously just how ‘temporary’ a shock is, or the 
extent to which it is external, there would seem to be good reason not to abandon the 
attempt prematurely. 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks. 
 
Increasing attention is being paid to IMF governance, as well as the structure and size 
of its lending operations. However, less attention has been paid to the array of 
windows through which the Fund makes its loans. An internal review (IMF, 2000) 
advised that one minor facility (the BSFF) that had not been used for more than 15 
years should be scrapped, but otherwise suggested little change. Indeed, the most 
recent phenomenon has been the introduction and subsequent abandonment, unused, 
of the Contingent Credit Lines designed to defend countries against the effects of 
contagion from economic crises elsewhere. At the same time, there are clear trends in 
the extent to which facilities are being used. The Compensatory Financing Facility, 
which is supposed to help deal with temporary external shocks, has fallen into disuse. 
Meanwhile extended arrangements that were popular at the end of the 1990s have 
been used infrequently in subsequent years. 
 
To the extent that it has taken place, discussion of the structure of IMF lending 
windows has focused on qualitative analysis of their raison d’être. In this paper, and 
as far as the data allow, we adopt a more quantitative approach. In particular we focus 
on the extent to which the economic circumstances in which countries sign extended 
and concessionary arrangements differ from those in which they sign conventional   17
stand-bys. On this basis we claim that there is a strong case for discontinuing the EFF 
in its current form. To return to our title, it should be ‘curtains’ for the EFF. But we 
also claim that empirical evidence supports the continuation of the PRGF; perhaps 
reformed to be in part financed from GRA resources and available without subsidy to 
middle income countries. We furthermore argue that there are analytical grounds for 
re-energising the Fund’s facility for dealing with external shocks emanating both from 
the current and capital account. Undoubtedly there will be institutional problems and 
resistance to overcome in putting these ideas into effect. Even so, the array of IMF 
lending windows may be more susceptible to reform than many of the other issues 
involved in IMF structure and governance.   18
Table 1.  IMF Arrangements in Effect as of April 30, 1995-2004 
 
           Amounts Committed Under Arrangements as of April 30 
Financial   Number of Arrangements as of April 30  (in millions of SDRs) 
Year Stand-by  EFF  SAF  PRGF  Total Stand-by  EFF  SAF PRGF  Total 
1995 19  9  1  27  56  13,190  6,840  49  3,306  23,385 
1996 21  7  1  28  57  14,963  9,390  182  3,383  27,918 
1997 14  11  -  35  60  3,764  10,184  -  4,048  17,996 
1998 14  13  -  33  60  28,323  12,336  -  4,410  45,069 
1999 9  12  -  35  56  32,747  11,401  -  4,186  48,334 
                
2000 16  11  -  31  58  45,606  9,798  -  3,516  58,920 
2001 17  8  -  37  62  34,906  8,697  -  3,298  46,901 
2002 13  4  -  35  52  44,095  7,643  -  4,201  55,939 
2003 15  3  -  36  54  42,807  4,432  -  4,450  51,689 
2004 11  2  -  36  49  53,944  794  -  4,356  59,094 
Source: IMF Annual Report, 2004 
 
 
Table 2. Outstanding IMF Credit by Facility and Policy, Financial Years Ended April 30, 1995-2004 
(In millions of SDRs and percent of total) 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
      (in  millions  of  SDRs)     
Stand-By Arrangements
1  15,117 20,700 18,064 25,526 21,213 21,410 17,101 28,612 32,241 42,070 
Extended  Arrangements  10,155  9,982 11,155 12,521 16,574 16,808 16,108 15,538 14,981 13,783 
Supplemental Reserve Facility  -  - -  7,100  12,655 -  4,085 5,875  15,700 6,027 
Compensatory Financing Facility  3,021 1,602 1,336  685 2,845  3,032  2,992 745 412 119 
Systemic Transformation Facility  3,848 3,984 3,984 3,869 3,364 2,718 1,933 1,311 644 154 
 
Subtotal (General Resources 
          
Account)  32,140 32,268 34,539 49,701 60,651 43,968 42,219 52,081 65,978 62,153 
SAF  Arrangements  1,277  1,208 954 730 565 456 432 341 137  86 
PRGF Arrangements
2  3,318 4,469 4,904 5,505 5,870 5,857 5,951 6,188 6,676 6,703 
























(Percent of total) 
Stand-By Arrangements
1  41 49 45 46 38 43 35 49 47 61 
Extended  Arrangements  28 24 28 22 25 33 33 26 21 20 
Supplemental  Reserve  Facility  -  -  - 13 19  -  9 10 21  9 
Compensatory Financing Facility  8 4 3 1 4 6 6 1 1 -
3 
Systemic Transformation Facility  10 9  10 7  5  5  4  2  1  -
3 
 
Subtotal (General Resources 
          
Account)    87 86 85 89 90 87 87 88 91 90 
            




2  9 11 12 10  9 12 12 11  9 10 


































1Includes outstanding credit tranche and emergency purchases 
2Includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development 
3Less than one-half of 1 percent of total 









Table 3: Multinomial Logit results for explaining EFF agreements relative to SBA 
agreements, given that countries signed a conditional IMF agreement. 
  
 
Explanatory variable  Estimated coefficient  Normal test statistic 
Constant 






% change in reserves-to-imports 
Current Account Balance/GDP 
Long-term current account balance  
% change in the current account  
Real exchange rate depreciation 
Debt service-to-exports ratio 
% change in the debt-service ratio 
Public external debt –to-GDP ratio 
Current rescheduling 
Reschedulings in past years 
Rescheduling required next year 
Past IMF agreements  
Exchange rate regime 


















































***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 2% and 5% levels for two-tailed 
tests, respectively.  20
Table 4: Multinomial Logit results for explaining concessional (SAF/ESAF/PRGF) 




Explanatory variable  Estimated coefficient  Normal test statistic 
Constant 






% change in reserves-to-imports 
Current Account Balance/GDP 
Long-term current account balance  
% change in the current account  
Real exchange rate depreciation 
Debt service-to-exports ratio 
% change in the debt-service ratio 
Public external debt –to-GDP ratio 
Current rescheduling 
Reschedulings in past years 
Rescheduling required next year 
Past IMF agreements  
Exchange rate regime 
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Appendix : Data definitions and sources. 
  
‘Signing of an IMF agreement in the following year’. An indicator variable with the 
values “1”, “2” and “3” if a country signed, respectively, a standby, EFF, or 
SAF/ESAF/PRGF  agreement in the following year. Source: IMF, Annual report, 
various years.  
 
‘GNP per capita’. GNI per capita in thousands of $U.S., Atlas method (World Bank, 
World Development Indicator) deflated by U.S. consumer price index (IMF: IMF 
Financial Statistics). 
 
‘GDP growth’.  Percentage change in GDP from the previous year (annual %). 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
‘Long-term growth’. Average annual GDP growth rate for the previous five years. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
‘Inflation’. Average annual percentage increase in the consumer price index. Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
‘Long-term inflation’. Average annual inflation rate for the previous five years. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
‘Reserves-to-imports’. Total foreign reserves divided by total imports of goods and 
services (both in current $US). Source: World Bank, Global Development Indicators. 
 
‘% change in reserves-to-imports’. The percentage change in the reserves-to-import 
ratio from the previous year to the current year, as a proportion of the previous year.  
 
‘Current Account Balannce/GDP’. The current account balance divided by total GDP 
(both in current $US). Source: World Bank, Global Development Indicators. 
 
‘Long-term current account balance’.  The average annual current account balance-to-
GDP ratio for the previous five years.  
 
‘% change in the current account’. The percentage change in the current account 
balance from the previous year to the current year, expressed as a percentage of the 
previous year. 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Indicators. 
 
‘Real exchange rate depreciation’. The official number of domestic currency units per 
$U.S. multiplied by the ratio of the U.S. consumer price index to the country’s 
consumer price index.  This number is calculated for the current year and for three 
years previously (adjusting for changes in base years) and the difference between the 
two is expressed as a proportion of the value from three years before. Source: World 
Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
‘Debt-service ratio’. Total long-term debt service payments divided by total exports of 
goods and services (all in U.S. dollars).  Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators.   22
 
‘% change in the debt-service-ratio’. The percentage change in the total debt service 
payments-to- exports ratio from the previous year to the current year, expressed as a 
percentage of the previous year. 
 
‘Public external debt-to-GDP ratio’. The ratio of public and publicly guaranteed long-
term debt expressed as a ratio of total GDP.  Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
 
‘Current rescheduling’. A binary indicator of whether or not the country had to 
reschedule some portion of its debt (principal or interest, official or private) in the 
current year, which requires by convention an IMF agreement to be in place. Source: 
World Bank, Global Development Finance. 
 
‘Reschedulings in past years’. The number of years out of the previous two years in 
which a country rescheduled some portion of its official or private interest or principal 
repayments. Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance. 
 
‘Rescheduling required next year’. A binary indicator of whether or not the country is 
about to reschedule some portion of its debt (principal or interest, official or private) 
in the following year, which requires by convention an IMF agreement to be in place. 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance. 
 
‘Past IMF agreements’.  A binary variable indicating whether an IMF arrangement 
has been in place for the country in any of the previous two years. Source: IMF, IMF 
Annual Report various years. 
 
‘Exchange rate regime’. The numerical category of exchange rate regime, on a scale 
from 1 to 5 moving from the least flexible to the most flexible. A sixth category was 
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